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enlarge the range of our perceptions, we may expand the cause beyond our original perception; we may add inference to inference, and include, for example, the body and its perceptive mechanism, or even inter-stellar happenings. In doing this, we interlard real qualities with ideal constructions, hereditary as well as individual, instinctive as well as rational, and, the chances are, eventually choose as the sole normal node of reference for reality its sensuous aspect, that is, its relation to perceptual consciousness.

But, even supposing the necessity of this choice, we may still urge that events are perceived as temporal in precisely the same sense in which they are perceived as spatial. I agree wholly with Professor Strong that the continuity of the world-order as a whole—whether temporal, spatial, or causal—is not directly conveyed in experience. But minor continuities are so conveyed, and our most ordinary life comports itself to the assurances which these continuities afford.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A System of Metaphysics. GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1904. Pp. x + 627.

'Back to Berkeley' is the suggestion which comes to the reader of Professor Fullerton's work from more than one aspect of the treatment. Indeed, the author himself often calls attention to the points of similarity between his doctrine and that of Berkeley. The theory of space, the relation between visual and tactual sensations, the almost complete ignoring of elements other than sensory, and lastly, a point which is decidedly in the author's favor, a lucid and trenchant style, all remind the reader of the brilliant writer of two centuries ago. In yet another respect the present treatise recalls Berkeley. Metaphysics for Professor Fullerton means almost precisely what it meant for Berkeley—chiefly a theory of knowledge, with some incidental treatment of the relation of mind to mind, and with a theistic outcome. Professor Fullerton has an extended discussion of the relation of mind and matter, but otherwise there is close agreement as to the scope and method. There is in Professor Fullerton's system little or no reference to conceptions of the universe, except under the categories of mechanism and teleology. There is no mention of the general conception of evolution. There is little or no effort to consider the nature of reality, except from the standpoint of the problem of knowledge. There is no effort to relate the moral or esthetic aspects of reality to its other aspects; so that if we were to take the title, 'A System of Metaphysics,' literally, it would leave out much which might reasonably be considered in a treatment of ultimate reality. Doubtless, however, an author has a right to write a book upon the subject which interests him, and if he pleases to call it 'A System of Metaphysics,' it may be said that the term has no such well-defined usage as would prevent him from so naming it.

The main interest of the work lies in the author's views as to the self, the external world, and the relation between the two. There is a brief chapter on the will, and two on God, but, as these topics seem to interest the author chiefly as an opportunity for the criticism of other theories, they may be omitted from this notice.

The view which the author presents of the external world, as he himself states, suggests the doctrine of Berkeley, Hume and Mill. Its main difference is its effort to avoid their psychological standpoint. 'The psychologist distinguishes between his consciousness of the real world and a real world which he assumes to lie beyond it' (p. 193). The key to the author's position is found in the conception of the symbol. The 'real,' 'external' world must be a world of which we are conscious, and therefore in a sense must be in consciousness. At the same time, it is evidently not identical with any particular intuition; for in any object regarded as real, there are parts or qualities not actually sensed at the moment, and perhaps, like the other side of the moon, never actually perceived. The real external world is thus a compound of sensational and imaginary elements. This 'is represented or symbolized in any specific consciousness by elements which must be in part, though not wholly, identical with the elements symbolized.' If we ask more specifically what kind of sensations belong to the real world and what to the symbol in consciousness, we are given an answer based in the first instance on Locke and Berkeley: the secondary qualities are subjective; visual sensations are signs of touch sensations. Sensations of touch and movement are capable of accurate measurement, 'fall into an interrelated system which is capable of accurate description, and, through their relations to which, sensations of other classes may be given that orderly arrangement which constitutes the difference between a chaos and a world.' The tactual world 'is what we mean by the objective; other elements of our experience are by contrast subjective' (p. 154). This distinction is further illustrated by space. 'All space is tactual space. Colors do not occupy the same place as the tactual things to which they belong. They do not occupy space at all, nor do sounds or tastes or odors.'

When now we come to the analysis of space, the aim is to distinguish between the space of intuition and 'real space.' The latter has the qualities which Kant attributed to space, viz., it is infinitely divisible, and is a single whole. On the contrary, the space of intuition is not infinitely divisible although it is composite. To reach a space to which mathematics will apply, with its lines which are always lines and not simple points, we substitute for the specific space of intuition a tactual space. But this is only a temporary resting-place, and we must substitute for this the space of 'real' things as conceived by science. Nor is this permanent: "Every reality in which we may rest at any time is, thus, a relative reality, and its space is relatively real. The absolute object and its absolute space are not *an* object (intuitive) and *a* space (the 'form' of an intuition), but rather an indefinite series of substitutions gathered up and hypostatized into an individual. It is to this absolute object and its absolute space that the mathematical conceptions apply in all their rigor" (p. 191). 'The real world in space and time, is then, a vast complex of tactual things standing to each other in certain relations of distance and direction, and passing through a system of changes.'

So much for the real world. What of the mind? The mind is for Professor Fullerton only a word for the 'totality of mental phenomena,' or 'a particular group of experiences.' Indeed, there seems little justification for using a noun in the singular when speaking of experiences which are referred to the 'subjective order.' The sort of experiences which are usually cited as evidence that there is something not included within the material world, are 'sounds, odors, colors, tastes.' Whether by accident or by choice, the processes of thinking and willing are not emphasized in forming the conception of the mental. Perhaps the author does not care to emphasize processes which seem to evidence unity and activity, for his satire is never keener nor his satisfaction more evident than in his derision of the doctrine of a self or knower, in distinction from the elements of consciousness,—elements of sensation and idea, of material and form. The Kantian or Neo-Kantian 'synthetic activity,' and the 'atomic self' of the 'plain man' are equally in contempt. A historical and psychological explanation is offered for the fact that certain thinkers have maintained the doctrine of a synthetic activity. It is a survival of the 'faculty' psychology: 'consciousness is complex; what can better synthesize than a synthetic activity?' (484). There is no theoretical justification for the assumption of any such activity, either outside of experience or within experience.

It might perhaps be supposed that in recognizing 'form' as one of the elements of consciousness, Professor Fullerton is doing justice to all that Kant really demonstrated as a non-sensational element in experience. If, however, Professor Fullerton intended to include in his analysis of consciousness anything corresponding to the *organization* of content, or anything which would imply that a self was shaping its content in accordance with needs or ends or categories of its own, he has certainly not made this prominent. He occasionally uses such words as 'conception,' speaks of the external world as a 'construct,' and in one passage which, so far as I have noticed, is unique, he actually speaks of what might be regarded as a constructive activity of consciousness in forming a geometrical conception of a line and point (p. 191). But if there is any active functioning of the intelligence assumed in the system, it is referred to incidentally, and not made a constitutive element in building up experience. The whole theory, in fact, is a theory of content. There is no important use of conceptions of function or activity or organization.

This applies as well to the theory of the external world. The difference between the subjective and the objective is found in the difference between the symbol and the symbolized, between the visual and the tactual. It is unnecessary to say that those who think that Kant contributed a new insight to the analysis of experience believe that, in the real world of objective things, the conception of permanence and the conception of causality, which are important elements in that very objective order of which Professor Fullerton speaks, can not be properly brought under the conception of sensation. If now Professor Fullerton replies that to allege any organizing activity in consciousness is to fall back upon the old faculty psychology, it is easy to retort that his own favorite expression, 'consciousness is complex,' carries with it as objectionable implications of a different sort. If space permitted, it would be easy to amuse the reader by replacing Professor Fullerton's ridicule of the literal, physical meaning of synthesis, given on page 481, with equally senseless ridicule of applying the term complex to the mind in a literal sense. How, it might be asked, can consciousness be 'folded together'? The real point of the matter is, of course, not in names, but in the general conception of experience which our names indicate; and my understanding is that Professor Fullerton, like Berkeley, would characterize all our experience in the general manner indicated by the term sensational, rather than in a manner indicated by the conception of organization. Berkeley, to be sure, believed in a self, but he gave it no function in the organization of experience. Professor Fullerton's construction of experience involves memory and imagination, but, with the exception of incidental hints, seems to involve nothing more.

But whatever may be one's view as to the necessity of a synthetic unity for knowledge, a more fundamental question of method is suggested. Is it good metaphysics to discuss the unity of the self—to say nothing of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God—from the cognitive aspect only? Action according to a purpose is certainly a phase of consciousness that should be reckoned with here. The facts of agency and responsibility have had a large share in the historical origin of the conception. They should still be considered, at least, in discussing the worth of the conception.

In the treatment of the relation between mind and body there is much acute criticism of both inter-actionistic and parallelistic theories. It is held that both involve a conception of mind and body as separate entities. Both attempt explanation by classification of the relation in question with what is really a material analogy. Nevertheless the author prefers the parallelistic point of view. In anticipation of the objection that parallelism explains nothing, he insists that 'we have no right to ask that the relation of mind and body be explained, in the usual sense of the term' (*i. e.*, by classing it with other relations). 'The relation of mind and body is unique.' Probably all would grant the uniqueness of this relation, but it is not especially illuminating to stop with this statement. It reads better as a first word than as a last word. If it is premature to ask for an 'explanation' of the origin of consciousness, of the significance of consciousness in evolution, of the process called control, it would at least not seem unreasonable to ask for some attempt to investigate in these directions. The 'plain man' is indeed reassuringly told that he may continue to say that certain changes in the physical world take place because a certain man formed a plan—provided he means only that there has been a constant relation between plan and accomplishment. But I for one should have been glad to have some suggestions toward a way of thinking consciousness and the physical world in view of these facts.

With regard to the discussions on space, it seems to me that the criticisms of the Kantian view misinterpret the implications of the phrase 'infinitely divisible.' To hold that a finite line, which is infinitely divisible, can be traversed, does not involve the doctrine that one must complete an infinite series in order to traverse it. The doctrine of infinite divisibility implies that if you proceed along a series, in which the law is that each successive term is half the preceding, you can never reach the limit *in that way*. This, however, does not mean that to pass over any space you must do it according to that law. Of course, too, the mathematical interpretation of his spinning top would be, that if the speed were increased the time of the revolution would approach nearer and nearer to zero as its limit; it would never reach that limit. While Professor Fullerton was inserting these puzzles, he might in consistency have further edified the reader by quoting one of the consequences of Berkeley's theory which that author himself was acute enough to discover, viz., that an isosceles right-angled triangle can not be drawn. For if a line is composed of a definite number of points, then the hypothenuse of such a triangle would have to be composed of a number of points equal to the square root of two, which is not an exact number.

In writing this notice I have sought to point out the chief features in the standpoint which seem to me to challenge attention. I have not thought it necessary to dwell on the acuteness, the brilliancy and the force with which Professor Fullerton has urged his views. These will be anticipated by those who are acquainted with his writing, and will be recognized by the reader. I can but feel, however, a decided regret that the author did not see fit to take up more directly the problems suggested to the thinker of to-day by natural science and history, and to push forward the boundary of our thinking along these lines.

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Analysis of 'Localization,' Illustrated by a Brown-Séquard Case. C. SPEARMAN. *British Journal of Psychology,* Vol. I., No. 3, pp. 286–314.

The main contention of this paper is in the direction of a vigorous protest against the dictum of Förster, that tactile localizing power is completely dependent upon the efficiency of movement-sensations. The occasion for the present analysis was afforded by a Brown-Séquard case under treatment in the Leipzig nerve hospital about a year ago. Upon admission to the hospital the condition of the patient was as follows: The